Thetis by Wind, Chris
but it is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law 
for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law 
(of which it can regard itself as the author)." Immanuel Kant. 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analysed 
by H.J . Paton. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964, pp. 98-99. 
4. Anthony Trollope. The Warden. New York: Washington Square 
Press, 1962, pp. 54-56. 
5. Robert Paul Wolff. The Autonomy of Reason. New York: Harper 
and Row, 1973, p. 15. 
6. In this connection, it is worth noting Genevieve Lloyd's demonstra-
tion of the "maleness" of reason itself, defined as it has been 
throughout the history of philosophy by exclusion of everything 
that is associated with, or believed to constitute, the feminine. Gene-
vieve Lloyd. The Man of Reason. London: Methuen, 1984. 
7. In the foregoingdiscussion 1 am indebted to O.J . Flanagan, Jr.. and 
J .E. Adler in their paper "Impartiality and Particularity," Social 
Research, Vol . 50, No. 3, October 1983. 
8. In much of this discussion of utilitarianism I am indebted to Susan 
Sherwin in her paper "Ethics: Towards a Feminist Approach," 
Canadian Women Studies, Vol . 6, No. 2, Spring 1985. 
9. This is true of the early social contract theories developed by 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, as well as John Rawls' more recent 
version of the theory, elaborated in A Theory of Justice. 
10. Virginia Held. Rights and Goods. New York: Macmillan, The Free 
Press, 1984, p. 75. 
11. It is worth noting that, while an excessively heteronomous person 
might be described as credulous, gullible, compliant, passive, sub-
missive, overdependent, or servile, it is difficult to find a term to refer 
to excessive autonomy. John Benson suggests that "solipsism" 
might do, or "arrogant self-sufficiency." John Benson. "Who is the 
Autonomous Man?," Philosophy, V o l . 58, 1983, p. 5. T h e list of 
terms to describe an excessively autonomous person is Benson's as 
well. 
12. O n the ontological level, this gives rise to the view that there is" 
indeed a problem about "other minds" that, rather than taking 
shared modes of being as a starting point for the development of 
moral theroy, the onus is upon one to demonstrate that it is reasona-
ble to take other human beings to be thinking, feeling creatures, as 
much like oneself as different. 
13. Some parts of my discussion of ecological thinking, and some of the 
following discussion of Caroline Whitbeck's work and of the friend-
ship model, appear in virtually the same form, though differently 
framed, in my "Second Persons," Canadian Journalof Philosophy, 
Supplementary Vol . 13, forthcoming. 
14. A n ecological concern is adumbrated in Alastair Maclntyre's After 
Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981) where he writes about the loss of 
human community as a place where human beings can flourish. 
Maclntyre deplores individualistic self-preoccupation, urging that 
human beings are not, and probably cannot be, self-making, but 
help to create and sustain each other. While the conception of the 
virtues to which he believes human beings should return is static 
and perhaps excessively conservative, there is in his work something 
of a move toward acknowledging the importance of human interde-
pendence which I would take to characterize ecological thinking. 
15. Caroline Whitbeck. "Feminist Ontology: A Different Reality," in 
Carol Gould, editor, Beyond Domination. Totowa, New Jersey: 
Rowman and Allenheld, 1983, p. 66. 
16. I am thinking, here, of the implications of Jane Flax's observation 
that "As long as patriarchy exists, differences will inevitably be 
translated into relations of dominance and submission, superiority 
and inferiority." Jane Flax. "Mother-Daughter Relationships: Psy-
chodynamics, Politics and Philosophy," in H . Eisenstein and A. 
Jardine, editors, The Future of Difference. New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1985, p. 37. 
17. Ruddick's view iselaborated in her "Maternal T h i n k i n g , " in Femi-
nist Studies, Summer 1980. My reservations about this position are 
explained in my "Second Persons." 
18. This is Mark Piatt's concept, elaborated in his Ways of Meaning. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 
19. The position I refer to is developed in her book. In a Different Voice. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982.1 intro-
duce her posi tion here with the claim that men and women speak in 
different moral voices rather than adhering to Gilligan's own for-
mulation, where women are said to speak in a different voice— 
presumably from men's. The rephrasing is important for two rea-
sons: first, it catches the symmetry of the relation of difference. If 
women speak in a different voice from men then clearly men, too, 
speak in a different voice from women. Secondly, and concomit-
antly, it dispels any residual impression that it is the male voice 
which constitutes the norm, from which the female voice is declared 
to deviate. 
20. In her elaboration of these points, Gil l igan draws particularly upon 
Nancy Chodorow's position, developed in The Reproduction of 
Mothering. Berkeley: T h e University of California Press, 1979. For 
an account of how such practices contribute to the creation of 
"autonomous man" see Chapter 9, "Mother-Monopolized Child 
Rearing" of Isaac Balbus' Marxism and Domination. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982. 
21. I am thinking here of Annette Baier's observations to this effect in 
her paper " D o i n g Without a Moral Theory?" in her Postures of the 
Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985. 
22. Baier, p. 232. 
23. Virginia Held, for example, maintains that the form of moral reflec-
tion for which she is arguing in Rights and Goods "can be plausible 
only if one's conception of morality includes both deontological 
and teleological components and allows for different resolutions of 
tensions between egoistic and communal claims in different 
domains. A pure Kantian, a pure utilitarian, a pure egoist, and a 
pure communitarian would find the analysis...hard to reconcile 
with his or her morality." (p. 35). 
24. Held, p. 59. 
This paper was made possible by a Strategic Grant from the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and by a Visiting 
Fellowship from the Humanities Research Centre at the Australian 
National University in Canberra. Earlier versions were read at the "Femi-
nism and Humanities" conference at the Humanities Research Centre, 
and to the Departments of Philosophy at the Universities of Melbourne 
and Auckland. I have benefitted from the discussions on those occasions. 
Thetis 
i remember the sixties 
a l l those l o n g haired draft dodgers 
a l l those sons of Thet is 
k n o w i n g (however unconsciously) 
that a way to avoid k i l l i n g 
a way to stop m a k i n g war 
is to become women 
(however incompletely) 
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